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Abstract 
Recently, Yang et al. (Quantum Inf Process 18, 74, 2019) proposed a two-party 
quantum key agreement protocol over a collective noisy channel. They claimed that 
their quantum key agreement protocol can ensure both of the participants have equal 
influence on the final shared key. However, this study shows that the participant who 
announces the permutation operation can manipulate the final shared key by 
himself/herself without being detected by the other. To avoid this loophole, an 
improvement is proposed here. 
Keywords Quantum cryptography. Quantum key agreement. Permutation attack. 
1. Introduction 
Since the first quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol has been proposed in 1984 [1], 
several QKD protocols [2, 3] and related protocols [4, 5] have been proposed. However, 
in these QKD protocols, the shared secret key is first determined by a participant or a 
third-party and then transmitted to the other participants. Different from the QKD 
protocols, to ensure all the participants have equal influence on the shared key, the 
quantum key agreement [6] (QKA) was proposed. In a QKA, none of the proper subset 
of the involved participants can determine any part of the final shared key without being 
detected by the others.  
    Recently, Yang et al. [7] proposed a two-party QKA protocol over a collective 
noisy channel. They claimed that, in their QKA protocol, each participant has an equal 
contribution to the final shared key. But this study shows that Yang et al.’s QKA 
protocol suffers from a permutation attack. That is, the participant who announces the 
permutation operation can manipulate the final shared key without being detected. Then, 
a simple modification is hence proposed here. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, Yang et al.’s QKA 
protocol is reviewed. In Section 3, we show the details of the permutation attack on 
Yang et al.’s QKA protocol and then propose a modified method to solve this problem. 
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At last, a conclusion is given in Section 4. 
2. A brief review of Yang et al.’s QKA 
Before reviewing Yang et al.’s QKA protocol [7], some background is introduced first 
here. 
2.1 Background 
In [8], four decoherence-free subspace (DFS) states { 0 01dp   , 1 10dp   , 
dp   
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In Yang et al.’s QKA protocol, the logical quantum states { 0L  , 1L  , L  , 
L } are used where L  represents ‘ dp ’ or ‘ r ’.  It means that if the states are used 
to avoid the collective-dephasing noise, L  represents ‘ dp  ’. Similarly, the L  
represents ‘ r ’ if the states are transmitted via a quantum channel with the collective-
rotation noise. According to the logical quantum states, four logical Bell states 
 , , ,L L L L        can be described as follows: 
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Moreover, four logical unitary operations { 00
LU , 01
LU , 10
LU , 11
LU } are used in Yang 
et al.’s QKA protocol. Each logical Bell state can be transformed into another logical 
Bell state by performing the logical unitary operations and the transformation 
relationships are shown in Table 1. 
 Table 1. The Bell states transformation results 
Initial state 00
LU  01
LU  10
LU  11
LU  
L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  
L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  
L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  
L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  
 
The Bell state entanglement swapping [9] also is used in Yang et al.’s QKA 
protocol. That is, suppose that 1 2,IS IS  are the initial states of two logical Bell states, 
respectively. Here,  '00', '01', '10', '11'i L L L LIS              ,  1, 2i  . 
By performing logical Bell measurement on both of the first logical particles and both 
of the second logical particles we can obtain the measurement results 1MR  and 2MR , 
respectively. The entanglement swapping of these logical Bell states follows the 
following formula  
1 2 1 2MR MR IS IS                         (2) 
2.2 Yang et al.’s QKA protocol 
Suppose that there are two participants Alice and Bob involved in Yang et al.’s QKA 
protocol and they have 2n  bits secret key  1 2= , , , nA A A AK k k k   and 
 1 2= , , , nB B B BK k k k , respectively. Here,  , 00,01,10,11i iA Bk k   1 i n  .  Then the 
protocol can be described step by step as follows. 
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Step 1.  Alice generates 2n  logical Bell states in L
 , and picks out all the first 
logical particles and all the second logical particles of L
  to form the 
ordered logical particle sequence  1 2 2= , , , nA A A AS s s s   and 
 1 2 2= , , , nB B B BS s s s , respectively. After that, Alice generates enough logical 
decoy photons where each logical photon is randomly selected from { 0L , 
1L  , L  , L  } and randomly inserts these decoy photons into BS  to 
obtain a new sequence BS . Finally, Alice sends BS  to Bob. 
Step 2.  After confirming that Bob has received BS , Alice and Bob use the logical 
decoy photons to check whether there is an eavesdropper during the particle 
transmission process or not. That is, Alice first announces the positions and 
the initial states of the logical decoy photons in BS  , then Bob uses the 
corresponding basis to measure each decoy photon. If the error rate of the 
measurement results exceeds a predetermined value, this protocol will be 
aborted. Otherwise, the protocol will go to the next step. 
Step 3.  After removing all the decoy photons, Bob can obtain the particle sequence 
BS . Subsequently, Alice and Bob perform logical Bell measurement on the 
particles  2 1 2,i iA As s   and  2 1 2,i iB Bs s  1 i n    to obtain the measurement 
result sequence  1 2= , , , nA A A AM m m m   and  1 2= , , , nB B B BM m m m  , 
respectively. According to the formula (2), we can know that A BM M . Here, 
for simplicity,  1 2= , , , nM m m m  is used to represent both of AM  and 
BM . 
Step 4.  Alice generates n  logical Bell states according to M  and performs one of 
the logical unitary operations { 00
LU  , 01
LU  , 10
LU  , 11
LU  } on each Bell state 
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according to AK . The generated logical Bell state sequence is named as CS . 
Then Alice performs a random permutation operation n  on CS  to obtain 
CS . At last, Alice inserts the logical decoy photons into CS  the same as she 
did in Step 1 to obtain CS  and sends CS  to Bob.  
Step 5.  After Bob receives CS , Alice and Bob use the logical decoy photons in CS  
to check the eavesdropping the same as they did in Step 2. Then Bob can 
obtain CS . 
Step 6.  Bob announces the value of  1 1 2 2= , , , n nB B B BK M k m k m k m     . 
Hence, Alice can derive Bob’s secret key  1 2= , , , nB B B BK k k k   by the 
equation =B BK M M K  . 
Step 7.  Alice publishes the permutation operation n  so that Bob can perform an 
inverse permutation operation on CS  to get CS  . Then Bob measures CS  
with the logical Bell measurement to obtain AM K  and derives Alice’s 
secret key AK . 
Step 8.  Alice and Bob compute the final shared key =( )AB A BK K K || ( AK BK
)M . 
3. A loophole in Yang et al.’s QKA protocol and an 
improvement  
Yang et al. claimed that the above QKA protocol can ensure both Alice and Bob have 
equal contribution to the final shared key ABK  and none of them can manipulate ABK  
without being detected by the other. However, this section shows that Alice can 
announce a fake permutation operation to select a preferred final key ABK   instead. 
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Then, to solve this problem, a simple solution is proposed. 
3.1 The loophole in Yang et al.’s QKA protocol 
At the end of Step 6, Alice can obtain Bob’s secret key BK  and then computes the 
final shared secret key =( )AB A BK K K || ( AK BK )M . If she does not want to use 
ABK  as the final shared secret key, then she can announce a fake permutation operation 
n
  in Step 7 instead. Upon receiving the fake permutation operation, Bob will use a 
corresponding fake inverse permutation operation to reorder CS  to a fake final key 
=( )AB A BK K K   || ( AK  BK )M  which is chosen by Alice.   
    For example, assume that  1 2= , =0011A A AK k k  ,  1 2= , =0110B B BK k k   and 
 1 2= , 1110M m m  , then the corresponding final key will be =( )AB A BK K K || ( AK
BK )M =01011011 . With the permutation attack, if Alice wants to choose a fake 
final key 11110001 instead, she can announce a fake permutation operation which 
reorders the measurement results of CS  from =AK M  1 1 2 2, 1101A Ak m k m    
to    2 2 1 1= , 0111A A AK M k m k m     . Then, Bob will obtain a fake 
 = =1001A AK K M M    and gets the fake final key =( )AB A BK K K   || ( AK  BK
)M =11110001. 
3.2 A solution to the loophole  
Because all the photons of CS  have been reordered, Alice can reorder these logical 
Bell states into a preferred order to manipulate the final shared key. If the permutation 
operation just performed on all the first logical qubits of the logical Bell states in CS , 
without the correct permutation operation, the Bell measurement performed by Bob on 
the particles will result in an entanglement swapping. The entanglement swapping 
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makes the measurement results random and hence Alice has no motivation to announce 
the fake permutation operation other than disrupting the QKA protocol. The detail of 
the improvement is as follows. 
Step 1*-3* are the same as Step 1-3 in Section 2. 
Step 4*. Similarly, Alice generates the logical Bell state sequence CS  . Then Alice 
performs a random permutation operation n  on all the first logical particles 
of Bell state in CS   to obtain CS  . At last, Alice inserts the logical decoy 
photons into CS  as same as she does in Step 1 to obtain CS  and sends CS  to 
Bob. 
Step 5*-8* are the same as Step 5-8 in Section 2. 
With this simple modified method, the permutation attack can be avoided. 
4. Conclusions 
Yang et al. proposed a two-party quantum key agreement protocol over a collective 
noisy channel. However, this study shows that Yang et al.’s QKA protocol suffers from 
a permutation attack. A solution is hence proposed here to avoid the loophole.  
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